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1 Introduction
War and famine have a long history of association.
Starving out the enemy has been a tactic used
throughout the ages, epitomised by the siege,
where a population is surrounded, effectively cut
off from outside supplies and subjected to
bombardment. During the war in the former
Yugoslavia, areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina1 were
successfully besieged by the Bosnian Serb army,
they were heavily shelled and access to supplies
was prevented.
The conflict in Bosnia resulted in heavy losses and
widespread destruction. Some 2.7 million
Bosnians, out of an original population of 4.4
million, either fled the country as refugees or were
internally displaced. Thousands of the displaced
sought refuge in small, besieged pockets, living in
overcrowded conditions without adequate water
and power supplies. Food supplies were abruptly
reduced, economic activity was severely disrupted
and welfare services were seriously affected. The
severe winters typical of Bosnia, with temperatures
dropping to below minus 20°C, exacerbated the
suffering.
The impact of the war on populations trapped in
the besieged areas of Bosnia threatened a
humanitarian disaster on an unprecedented scale,
and historical experience suggested a potential for
widespread starvation. Blockades and sieges, which
had taken place in Europe, largely during the First
and Second World Wars, had resulted in thousands
of people dying from starvation and disease. For
example, the allied blockade of Germany from
March 1915 to 1918 by the British and French
caused food shortages and soaring food prices. The
particularly severe winter of 1916–17, when the
potato crop failed (dubbed the ‘turnip-winter’)
exacerbated the situation, and cases of
tuberculosis, hunger oedema and micronutrient
deficiency diseases became rife. The number of
deaths in Germany increased from 88,235 in 1915
to 293,760 in 1918, despite a drop in the birth rate
from 30/1,000 to 15/1,000 between 1914 and
1919. Mortality increases were particularly high
among children and the elderly (Vincent 1985).
The creation of the Warsaw Ghetto by the Germans
in 1940 confined up to 445,000 Jews in a 3.5 square
mile area that normally housed about 160,000. The
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official ration was 184 kcals per day for Jews in the
ghetto (compared with 2,613 kcal for Germans in
Poland) and 699 kcal for Poles (Roland 1992). These
are clearly not rations meant for survival: the Nazis
had calculated that they could destroy the
population in the Warsaw Ghetto in nine months
through mass starvation and accompanying
infectious diseases (Winick 1994). Poor hygiene re-
ignited typhus and an epidemic flared up. A further
hardship was the cold, and the practice of sleeping
in clothes facilitated the spread of typhus through
lice. Between November 1940 and June 1942,
doctors working inside the ghetto recorded a total of
70,381 deaths of which 18,237 were due to
starvation, 2,509 to typhus and the remaining to
‘unknown’ causes, though this was usually believed
to be starvation (Fliederbaum et al. 1994). People
outside the ghetto were able to access other sources
of food (e.g. trade with farmers), but people inside
officially had no access to other sources. Actually, all
sorts of black market trading went on between the
inhabitants of the ghetto and those outside, which is
why starvation did not kill everybody and the Nazis
finally razed the ghetto to the ground.
The siege of Leningrad between September 1941 and
January 1944 by German forces involved incessant
aerial bombing and shelling, while the winter of
1941–2 was the coldest in over a century. Lack of fuel
reduced the power supply, badly affecting heating
and restricting cooking, water and sewerage systems
were damaged by shelling and there were increasing
food shortages. Weight loss was estimated to be up to
33 per cent of pre-starvation weight while scurvy,
pellagra and night blindness had all appeared by the
end of the winter. Diseases such as dysentery,
bronchopneumonia and tuberculosis were rampant
and a typhus epidemic started. Estimates of deaths
attributable to starvation during the siege range from
630,000 to 1 million out of a pre-war population of
2.5 million (Keys et al. 1950; Salisbury 1969).
Also during the Second World War, the Dutch
‘hunger winter’ between September 1944 and May
1945 had particularly adverse effects on the cities
of western Holland. Roads and canals were
guarded to prevent smuggled goods being brought
in and while country dwellers were able to live
without much distress, urban populations, only a
few miles away, suffered immense deprivation. The
winter of 1944/45 was one of the most severe in
many years. There was no electricity, wood, coal or
running water and the sewerage system broke
down. Rations were successively cut and by
January 1945 the daily ration in Amsterdam
amounted to just 450 kcal/day. Mortality from
undernutrition was reported to be 104 deaths per
week in The Hague (total population 500,000),
136 per week in Rotterdam (total population
650,000), and a total of 2,351 deaths in the period
November 1944 to July 1945 in Amsterdam (total
population 700,000) (Smith 1947).
The factors which precipitated these localised
famines were similar to those afflicting Bosnia in
the 1990s: a sudden disruption of the food supply;
serious shortages of water, power and heating;
inadequate shelter; overcrowding; disintegration of
preventative and curative health services; and cold
winters.
Furthermore, humanitarian agencies were apparently
unable to bring in enough food aid to Bosnia to meet
the shortfall. During the first six months of the siege
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Box 1: Coping strategies employed in the besieged areas of Bosnia
Direct link with food Indirect link with food
 Cultivation of gardens  Paid employment:
 Food parcels from relatives abroad – formal (e.g. army, police, trading)
 Reduction in intake of food – informal (e.g. selling firewood, knitwear)
 Change in dietary patterns  Private savings
 Barter (e.g. cigarettes for food)  Sale of possessions
 Cash gifts from relatives abroad
 ‘Illegal’ activities (e.g. black market, smuggling, 
stealing, prostitution, etc.)
of Sarajevo, only 20–25 per cent of estimated food
needs could be airlifted into the city (James 1992;
Robertson 1992), while between January 1993 and
March 1994, food aid needs were never fully met,
averaging only 50 per cent for Central Bosnia (WFP
1994a). The media and international humanitarian
agencies alike predicted famine as winter approached
in 1992 and again in 1993.
Yet, despite predictions of imminent starvation
from such authoritative sources as the World
Health Organization, the expected famine failed to
materialise. The question addressed in this article
is: why was there no famine in the besieged areas of
Bosnia during the war?
2 Why was there no famine in
Bosnia?
While the besieged populations were subjected to
horrifying conditions including an abrupt and
severe reduction in food availability, the decline in
food accessibility did not become so critical as to be
deemed a famine. The population retained access
to a variety of alternative sources of food and were
able to adopt a series of coping strategies in order
to obtain food (Watson and Vespa 1995). These are
illustrated in Box 1. Furthermore, despite the
collapse of the health care system, disruption of the
water supply, erosion of environmental sanitation
services, and a subsequent rise in infectious disease
(e.g. a 13-fold increase in incidence of diarrhoeal
diseases (Puvacic and Weinberg 1994)), epidemics
of the big killers (e.g. cholera, dysentery, typhus)
were avoided. Adults lost weight and wasting levels
among the elderly rose (Vespa and Watson 1995),
but there was no widespread malnutrition or raised
mortality rates associated with malnutrition.
It is argued here that pre-crisis conditions and the
huge humanitarian response to the crisis in Bosnia
played crucial roles in averting famine.
Comparisons are made with African countries that
experienced famine during the 1990s, to establish
what the major criteria were in protecting the
Bosnian population from famine.
2.1 Pre-crisis conditions
There were a number of factors in pre-war Bosnia,
which protected the population against famine.
These include good socio-economic conditions,
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Table 1: Economic and living standard indicators in selected countries, 1990
Countries GDP per capita Life expectancy IMRb (per 1,000 Adult literacy (%)
(PPP$)a (years) live births)
Former Yugoslavia 3,060 72 20 93
Angola 840 46 128 42
Ethiopia 369 46 125 n/a
Liberia 857 54 131 40
Mozambique 1,072 48 149 33
Rwanda 657 50 112 50
Sierra Leone 1,086 42 146 21
Somalia 836 46 125 24
Sudan 949 51 102 27
Zaire 367 53 96 72
n/a = not available
Source: UNDP 1993; WHO; World Bank 1992
a PPP = Purchasing Power Parity. The purchasing power of a country’s currency is the number of units of that currency
required to purchase the same representative (or similar) basket of goods and services that a US dollar (the reference
currency) would buy in the United States (UNDP 1995).
b 1991 rates.
good health and nutrition status, and a
demographic profile with a majority of adults who
were able to look after the vulnerable – children
and the elderly (i.e. a low dependency ratio).2
Socio-economic conditions
The economy, standard of living and education level
in Bosnia were relatively good before the war while
the infrastructure was well developed. Some basic
indicators of well-being are presented in Table 1,
and show that the former Yugoslavia was much
better off compared with African countries which
experienced famine during the 1990s. The
underlying structural failures (chronic food
insecurity, poverty, underdeveloped infrastructure),
which have played crucial roles in causing famine in
Africa and Asia, were not present in Bosnia before
the war. Thus, although the war had devastating
consequences, the population was better equipped
to deal with the adverse environment.
Health status
Health indicators for the former Yugoslavia and
African countries which experienced emergencies
during the 1990s are shown in Table 2, and
illustrate the differences in pre-crisis health status
and access to health services. Although much of the
data are missing or unreliable, in general, the
population of the former Yugoslavia were less likely
to die prematurely, lived for longer, had better
access to health services and received better quality
health care than the African populations. Thus, the
health of the Bosnian population was not stressed
before the war. Rather, health status and standards
of care were good and the population was better
able to combat adverse health conditions compared
to populations who were already suffering from
poor health.
A further factor which protected the Bosnian
population, was the pre-crisis disease
epidemiology. Before the war, rates of chronic
diseases were on the rise in Bosnia, but there were
low rates of infectious diseases (diarrhoea, acute
respiratory infection, AIDS, malaria, etc.), which
are associated with malnutrition and mortality in
poorer countries. Furthermore, vaccination levels
were high so that the majority of children were
protected against potentially deadly childhood
diseases. The deterioration of the public health
system was, therefore, likely to have a less
devastating and slower impact on health status.
Nutrition status
Malnutrition, unassociated with specific disease
syndromes, was rarely seen in Bosnia before the
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Table 2: Health indicators in selected countries
Countries One-year-olds Maternal Population per
immunised mortality rate doctor 1984
1990–2 (per 100,000
live births) 1988
polio measles
Former Yugoslavia 81 76 27 250
Angola 13 26 900 17,750
Ethiopia 13 10 900 78,780
Liberia 28 61 600 9,340
Mozambique 53 60 800 n/a
Rwanda 85 81 700 35,090
Sierra Leone 72 65 1,000 13,620
Somalia 18 30 900 19,950
Sudan 67 66 700 10,190
Zaire 31 31 700 13,540
n/a = not available
Source: UNDP 1993; UNICEF 1994
war. Obesity, on the other hand, was a problem.
For example, a study of non-manual workers in
Sarajevo found that while only 4.3 per cent of
adults were underweight (body mass index (BMI)
<18.5), 8 per cent were obese (BMI >30.5) (Zec et
al. 1995). Although population level data on adult
nutritional status are scarce, Figure 1 illustrates the
different patterns of obesity and malnutrition in
Europe and the USA compared with African and
Asian countries for which data are available.
Relatively good pre-crisis nutritional status was an
important factor in protecting the Bosnian
population against dangerous weight loss. The
initial ‘fat stocks’ of the Bosnian population acted as
a buffer against malnutrition and it would have
taken longer for malnutrition to develop in this
population compared to already nutritionally
stressed populations.
Demographic profile
Evidence from famines in developing countries
shows that mortality and malnutrition rates are
highest among young children (Toole and Waldman
1990; 1993) because of their vulnerability to food
shortage and infection. The demographic structure
of developed countries, including pre-war Bosnia,
was different from that in developing countries,
however. There were proportionally fewer young
children and a greater proportion of the elderly, as
Figure 2 demonstrates. Overall, this meant that in
Bosnia, the dependent population most vulnerable
during a crisis, represented a lower percentage of
the population than in developing countries. Thus,
there were proportionally more able-bodied adults
to take care of vulnerable children and elderly
people.
2.2 International response to the crisis
The war in the former Yugoslavia sent shock-waves
throughout the world. This was the first major war
in Europe since the Second World War and the
sight of European women and children fleeing from
their villages jolted the memories of those who had
witnessed similar scenes 50 years previously. Even
before the war started in Bosnia, the UN Security
Council had passed its first resolution demanding
an immediate cessation to hostilities in Croatia and
ordering a complete arms embargo on Yugoslavia
(Resolution 713, September 1991). The fighting
continued however, and in February 1992, the first
peace-keeping forces were sent by the UN to
maintain stability in the Serbian-held areas of
Croatia (Bennett 1995; Glenny 1992; Kaplan 1994;
Mercier 1994; Silber and Little 1995).
The war spread to Bosnia in the spring of 1992. As
stories of ethnic cleansing and the existence of
concentration camps in Bosnia began to filter out,
the consciences of Western countries became
increasingly uncomfortable and international
diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis were
intensified. A series of attempts to orchestrate a
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Figure 1: Obesity and malnutrition in selected countries*
Source: Shetty and James 1994; Zec et al. 1995. 
* Only limited data from developing countries on obesity and malnutrition are available. These data are from
population surveys carried out between 1975 and 1990.
ceasefire and political agreement between the
warring parties were made. Though many of the
agreements were signed, each one was broken and
the atrocities continued until the signing of the
Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995.
Decisive military action by the UN was not
forthcoming throughout the war in Bosnia, and it
was NATO who carried out the air strikes against
key Bosnian Serb targets in September 1995, which
were instrumental in bringing an end to the war.
Instead, the UN opted to respond to the crisis by
sending humanitarian aid, and military action was
restricted to a joint UN Protection Force whose
specific mandate was to protect the safe delivery of
humanitarian aid (UN 1993).
Support for humanitarian action
The worldwide attention paid to the crisis in the
former Yugoslavia was reflected in the magnitude of
the appeals made for aid and the subsequent donor
response. As a result, the humanitarian assistance
operation in the former Yugoslavia was one of the
largest humanitarian initiatives ever undertaken by
the international community (UNHCR and WFP
1998). Donations to the former Yugoslavia tended
to be more generous than to African countries also
facing crises during this period, leading to large
disparities in per capita spending.
For example, in 1992, the year that war broke out
in the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR, the lead UN
agency, received a total of US$294.4 million for the
former Yugoslavia from specifically earmarked
Special Programme money. Contributions for 1993
were expected to double to US$447.6 million
(UNHCR 1994). The large donations changed the
proportion of world UNHCR expenditure
completely, with Europe receiving more than Africa
(see Figure 3). Thus, while Africa held about one-
third of the world’s refugee population in 1992,
UNHCR expenditure per person on the 15 million
displaced and 6 million refugees in Africa was
about US$13.5, while in the former Yugoslavia,
spending per person on the 3 million refugees and
displaced was about US$98.
Similarly, the European Community Humanitarian
Office (ECHO) – currently the largest food aid
donor in the world – spent ECU 1,221 million on
humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia between
1992 and 1998 and only ECU 390 million between
October 1993 and 1998 on the Great Lakes crisis,
which affected Rwanda, Burundi and neighbouring
countries (http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/echo/
crisyugo.html). In 1993 alone, ECHO’s allocations
to relief operations in the former Yugoslavia were
ECU 395 million which represented no less than
63 per cent of ECHO’s total expenditure for the
year (ECHO 1994).
Food aid donations
Food aid contributed a significant proportion of
humanitarian aid, and the cost of purchasing,
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Figure 2: Age distribution in selected countries, 1990
Source: World Bank 1992
transporting and distributing food in the former
Yugoslavia was enormous. WFP estimated that the
food aid operation cost US$1.3 million per day at
the beginning of 1993 (WFP 1993). In total, some
US$710 million for over 1.14 million tons of food
were provided to the former Yugoslavia between
1992 and 1997. The majority of this went to Bosnia.
The vast amounts of food aid going to the former
Yugoslavia were reflected in patterns of
expenditure. For example, WFP per capita
spending (for relief and development projects) in
sub-Saharan Africa was US$1.80 compared with
US$5.43 in Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States in 1993, largely due to
increased food aid flows to the former Yugoslavia
(WFP 1994b). In 1998, WFP expenditure on each
returnee, displaced person and war victim in the
former Yugoslavia was projected to be US$13.55,
while spending on each victim of conflict in the
Rwanda/Burundi region was US$6.14 and on each
displaced person and refugee in Liberia was
US$1.78 (WFP 1998).
The differences in expenditure are, however, partly
due to the different costs involved in transporting
and distributing food in Europe compared with
Africa. When the actual quantities of food aid
distributed per person are compared, there is
greater equity. For instance, during 1993 when the
war in the former Yugoslavia was at its height, an
estimated 343,772 metric tons of relief food aid
was distributed to 3.78 million beneficiaries. This
is equivalent to about 91 kg per beneficiary. In
1994, during the Great Lakes crisis, 359,612
metric tons were distributed in Burundi, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire to approximately 4
million beneficiaries. This is equivalent to about 89
kg per beneficiary.
Nevertheless, a detailed study analysing food aid
flows concluded that there has been progressively
greater diversion of US food aid from developing
countries to eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Republics since 1989 (Benson and Clay 1998). The
authors estimate that globally 10–12 million tons of
cereals food aid, or about 20 per cent of shipments,
were diverted from developing countries to eastern
Europe between 1989–90 and 1993–4.
Adequacy of the food aid response
Although enormous amounts of food aid were
channelled into Bosnia, WFP food aid deliveries to
Sarajevo and Central Bosnia, prior to the ceasefire in
February 1994, fell short of estimated requirements.
In the five months before the ceasefire, an average of
84 per cent of food aid requirements were delivered
to Sarajevo and only 38 per cent were delivered to
Central Bosnia. Furthermore, the ration distributed
during this period was designed to meet minimum
energy and protein requirements and was deficient
in several essential micronutrients. The inadequate
levels of vitamin A, vitamin C, niacin, riboflavin and
iron were of particular concern, as outbreaks of
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Figure 3: UNHCR expenditure for 1992
Source: UNHCR 1994
deficiency diseases due to a lack of these
micronutrients have occurred in recent emergencies
(Toole 1994).
If estimated requirements for food aid had been
accurate and there was a shortfall in food aid
distributions, malnutrition including micronutrient
deficiencies would have occurred during this
period. Although the population of the besieged
areas lost weight and may have suffered from sub-
clinical micronutrient depletion, there were no
clinical signs of malnutrition and anthropometric
status did not drop to a critical level.
It is therefore concluded that food aid requirements
were overestimated in Bosnia. The dependency on
food aid, though great, was not as large as estimated
and the populations in besieged areas were able to
survive by accessing food from alternative sources.
It can, therefore, be argued that the food aid
response to the crisis in Bosnia was successful partly
because there was an overestimation of needs,
which meant that failures in the distribution system
(an almost inevitable occurrence in conflict
situations) were not disastrous.
2.3 Protection from famine
The preceding discussion allows a number of
conclusions to be drawn about the factors that
helped to protect the populations of the besieged
areas of Bosnia against famine.
First, the relatively good socio-economic conditions
in pre-war Bosnia meant that the population was
better able to withstand the adversities of war. The
underlying structural failures (chronic food
insecurity, poverty, underdeveloped infrastructure),
which have played crucial roles in causing famine in
developing countries were not present in pre-war
Bosnia. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of
repeated crises (e.g. droughts) is much worse than a
single acute crisis (as in Bosnia). Household
vulnerability will increase through the progressive
depletion of food stocks and capital assets as a result
of repeated assaults.
Second, the initially good health and nutrition
status of the Bosnian population was a protective
factor against health and nutrition stresses. Healthy
people, whose immune systems have not been
repeatedly compromised, will be better able to
combat an adverse health environment than
unhealthy people. Fatter people will take longer to
become malnourished than thinner people.
Third, the disease epidemiology in pre-war Bosnia
showed a pattern of low rates of infectious diseases
and high rates of chronic disease. Vaccination levels
were also relatively good. Epidemics of infectious
disease were, therefore, less likely to occur than in
environments which already have high rates of
infectious diseases, as in developing countries.
Fourth, the age distribution in pre-war Bosnia
favoured able-bodied adults over children and the
elderly. There were, therefore, proportionally fewer
vulnerable children and elderly per adult than in
developing countries. Thus, the ability to care for
and protect the vulnerable within the community
was probably better.
Fifth, the vast humanitarian response to the crisis
in Bosnia helped to alleviate suffering. Although
food aid was apparently inadequate to meet
requirements during particularly critical periods of
the war, the overestimation of needs meant that
failures in the distribution system were not
disastrous and besieged populations were able to
resort to alternative sources of food.
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Notes
1. For the sake of brevity, Bosnia and Herzegovina will
be referred to as Bosnia.
2. Dependency ratio is the ratio of the population
defined as ‘dependent’ – children under 15 and the
elderly over 64 years – to the working-age
population, aged 15–64 (UNDP 1993).
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